Food for thought: reactions to the UNSG’s Policy Paper on the Global Digital Compact
To date, none of these questions have been answered in full, and there’s no indication of how stakeholders will be involved going forward. To date, our opportunities to engage with the GDC text have been fairly limited: a written consultation (see our response here), and a series of oral consultations on specific thematic areas known as ‘deep dives’.
This lack of clarity is concerning from a human rights point of view. The GDC is an opportunity for all UN member states to affirm their commitment to inclusive and rights-respecting approaches to the governance of digital technologies. However, at the same time, it could embed poor norms and standards, which could then have a wider impact across relevant frameworks and policies—not only at the UN and its institutions, but also within member states.
Last month, the UNSG’s Office released its own input into the GDC process, in the form of a policy paper. While there is no guarantee that the recommendations and framing in the document will shape ongoing discussions, it is likely to be a reference point for discussion among states and stakeholders as we enter the murkily defined next phase of engagement. Below, we offer some reflections and thoughts on the UNSG’s input, with the aim of supporting inclusive discussions around the GDC.
1) References to human rights and international law should be strengthened
Throughout the paper, there is a notable lack of mention of human rights. For example, in the AI section, numerous recommendations—including those to member states, regulators and industry—refer to the need for AI systems to be “aligned with human values”, instead of international human rights law and standards. This is a huge missed opportunity to promote rights-respecting AI governance.
Similarly, in the trust and security section, the framing focuses on “addressing harmful content and promoting safe civic spaces” and “information integrity”. Such an approach to trust and security risks conflating discussions on regulating and governing content online with a wide range of other issues, including cybercrime and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. References to “responsible use of technology” and “zero-tolerance approaches” (to, for example, gender-based violence)—with no reference to the need to ensure these are rights-respecting or rooted in international human rights law—risks securitising discussions in a way that would ultimately harm vulnerable and marginalised groups.
On data protection, the paper doesn’t reference existing safeguards under international law for the right to privacy, nor the contexts in which data can be collected and processed or the need for all states to develop and implement data protection and governance laws on the basis of international human rights law. Instead, there is just a recommendation that member states legally mandate protections for personal data and privacy, which only refers to two relevant international instruments (the African Malabo Convention and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation). In fact, the language around data is unclear across the document. Wherever there are references to “harnessing data at scale”, there is a lack of differentiation between personal and non-personal data (such as that linked with climate change); and, as such, there is no clarity on what kind of difference should be established to ensure the “harnessing” of data is compatible with the privacy of individuals. The differences between these two categories of data should be recognised, and any references to building widely accessible datasets and data commons in future discussions should make clear that these should be consistent with the protection of human rights.
These are just a handful of examples of how the paper could be strengthened from a human rights perspective to ensure—as the original proposal for a Compact suggests—that the text of the GDC is “anchored in universal human rights”. On a positive note, we welcome the proposal to establish an OHCHR advisory board, as it could support greater awareness of the work of the OHCHR and HRC, which has for far too long been lacking.
2) The risk of forum duplication needs to be addressed
The paper suggests the establishment of a brand new mechanism—the Digital Cooperation Forum (DCF)—to implement the GDC. However, there isn’t a strong rationale as to why the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), an existing and long-established site for multistakeholder discussion around internet governance, cannot assume those responsibilities.
Those calling for a new forum argue that the IGF is insufficiently ‘action-oriented’—a sounding board, rather than a site for concrete implementation. But this ignores recent steps the IGF has taken to address this critique: including through the creation of its Leadership Panel, which provides stronger mechanisms for coordinating with other UN bodies. The proposed DCF as recommended largely duplicates all the current functions of the IGF, and there is insufficient difference between the two in the document to justify the substitution of an already developed body with practices and processes that is multistakeholder, bottom-up and open in nature. Such a duplication of functions risks further fragmenting and complicating the internet governance ecosystem and creating a forum that is closed to civil society, instead of strengthening a multistakeholder forum that has historically been very open.
Investing the IGF with responsibility for the GDC, as some have suggested, could help strengthen it as a forum, and go some way to ‘solving’ the longstanding conundrum of how to make the IGF more impactful. However, that would require additional funding for the IGF to successfully undertake these responsibilities.
The IGF has already shared a proposal for a mechanism for IGF-GDC coordination, which will be a focal point for discussion at the upcoming Open Consultation and MAG meeting in July. The meeting will provide insight into member states’ and civil society’s position on the DCF versus IGF debate, which GPD will be closely monitoring.
3) Need for more contextualised, bottom-up solutions
Whatever the Global Digital Compact looks like (it could, for example, outline specific actions tied to objectives and principles), it should be mindful of the need to develop contextualised, bottom-up solutions. For example, the current proposal to standardise (undefined) ‘digital public infrastructure and digital public goods’ through a ‘Common Blueprint for Digital Transformations’ should be sensitive to varying requirements, social and cultural backgrounds, and levels of preparedness depending on the national context. And, while there is reference to the need to ensure diverse and representative datasets to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, this should be strengthened to recognise the need for such efforts to be underpinned by a thorough assessment of local realities and needs.
Next steps
The policy brief we have analysed above is only one of 11 inputs on the Global Digital Compact, designed to inform discussions on the elements of the Summit for the Future in 2024. Other inputs relating directly to digital technology—including on Information Integrity, which proposes a Code on Information Integrity and a forthcoming publication on a New Agenda for Peace—also merit scrutiny by stakeholders.